Securing Aviation Maintenance Communications for the Quantum Era: NEdHo Aviation's Contribution to PiQASO

Motivation & challenges

Aviation maintenance relies heavily on email to exchange critical information, including maintenance schedules, diagnostic reports, technical instructions, and component replacement records.

Unauthorized access, message manipulation, or sender impersonation could compromise operational efficiency and potentially affect aviation safety.

Beyond existing cybersecurity threats, the emergence of quantum computing introduces additional risks. Future quantum computers could undermine widely used cryptographic algorithms, exposing sensitive information to “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” attacks, where encrypted data is collected today for future decryption.

The main challenge is therefore to strengthen email security while preserving compatibility with existing systems and avoiding disruptions to established maintenance workflows.

Current landscape Aviation maintenance organizations typically rely on standard email protocols, such as SMTP and IMAP, with TLS encryption protecting data during transmission. Additional solutions, including S/MIME and OpenPGP, provide message-level security but may rely on cryptographic algorithms vulnerable to future quantum attacks.

Furthermore, conventional transport encryption does not necessarily protect information stored on intermediate servers or independently verify the trustworthiness of message content.

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) offers an alternative through algorithms designed to resist both classical and quantum attacks.

The PiQASO project addresses the challenge of integrating these technologies into existing communication systems through flexible, software-based security solutions.

PiQASO – Use Case 6.2: Quantum-Secure Aviation Maintenance Services Email Communication

NEdHo Aviation’s Use Case 6.2 focuses on integrating post-quantum cryptography into aviation maintenance email infrastructures to strengthen confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity without requiring major infrastructure changes.

The proposed architecture combines client-side cryptographic modules, a centralized PiQASO Server for key management, and quantum-resistant communication protocols.

It investigates two main scenarios:

Secure Internal Email Communication

The first scenario protects email exchanges between employees within the same organization.

Messages are encrypted directly on users’ devices using post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms before being transmitted through existing email servers. Only authorized recipients can decrypt them, reducing the exposure of sensitive maintenance information.

The solution explores both locally managed encryption and centralized key-management services, providing flexibility for different operational requirements.

Secure External Email Communication

The second scenario focuses on communication with external MRO organizations and partners that may not yet support post-quantum cryptography.

A secure internal gateway translates quantum-resistant encrypted messages into formats compatible with conventional email infrastructure.

This approach aims to strengthen security within the organization’s network while maintaining interoperability with external partners during the transition toward quantum-resistant systems.

Goals and Objectives

The primary objective of Use Case 6.2 is to demonstrate that quantum-resistant email security can be integrated into aviation maintenance operations without compromising efficiency or interoperability.

The main goals are to:

Protect sensitive maintenance information against current and future cybersecurity threats.

Strengthen message authenticity and integrity through advanced cryptographic mechanisms.

Maintain compatibility with existing email systems and external partners.

Minimize operational disruption through software-based integration.

Support trustworthy maintenance decisions by improving communication security.

Initial Progress and Next Steps

Initial activities have focused on designing, integrating, and evaluating secure internal email communications.

Experimental testing has demonstrated promising results, with low cryptographic processing times and efficient handling of simulated aviation maintenance documents. These findings indicate that post-quantum security can be introduced with limited performance overhead under the evaluated conditions.

The next phase will focus on external communication, including compatibility with legacy systems, advanced key-management mechanisms, and secure message translation.

Towards a More Secure Future for Aviation Maintenance

As aviation becomes increasingly digital, protecting sensitive operational information is essential for maintaining safety, reliability, and resilience.

Through PiQASO, NEdHo Aviation contributes to the development of practical quantum-resistant technologies adapted to the needs of the aerospace industry.

By combining aviation maintenance expertise with post-quantum cryptographic innovation, the project aims to enable more secure, trustworthy, and future-ready communications across the aviation ecosystem.

About NedHo Aviation

NEdHo Aviation specializes in technical services for the aerospace industry, providing aircraft maintenance support, project management, Aircraft on Ground (AOG) assistance, aircraft redelivery services, and technical consultancy.

Operating in a safety-critical industry, the company recognizes the importance of protecting sensitive maintenance information and ensuring reliable communication between aviation stakeholders.

As a partner in the European PiQASO project , NEdHo Aviation contributes its industry expertise to developing and validating quantum-resistant cybersecurity solutions, focusing on secure email communications in aviation maintenance environments.

The project funded under Grant Agreement No. ​101190366​ is supported by the European Cybersecurity Competence CentreFunded by the European Union.
Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Cybersecurity Competence Centre.
Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.